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INTRODUCTION
The advent of Web 2.0 technologies and applications has en-
abled average people-who were previously mere consumers of
online content-to publish their own content on various websites,
such as blogs, consumer-evaluation platforms (such as Amazon,
eflay, and TripAdvisor), news websites (through reader com-
ments), social networking services (such as Facebook, Twitter,
and Linkedln), media-sharing websites (such as Instagram and
YouTube), and collaborative-writing projects (such as Wikipedia).
Some of these user contributions may be defamatory, and one of
the most complex and intriguing legal questions in this context is:
Who should be liable for defamatory statements made online by
anonymous (or pseudonymous) users? This Essay critically eval-
uates the answers given in various Western jurisdictions and ar-
gues that economic analysis supports a revolutionary liability re-
gime, which we call "residual indirect liability."1
Our main theoretical contribution lies in recognizing that the
legal response to online anonymous defamation should be viewed
and analyzed as a combination of two components. The first is the
ability (or inability) to bring an action against the content pro-
vider-the platform that enables the defamatory statement. Such
an action may require modification of substantive law-the recog-
nition of some sort of indirect liability.2 The second component is
the ability (or inability) to bring an action against the speaker-
the anonymous user. Such an action does not require modification
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of Oxford; Professor of Law and Director of the Aptowitzer Center for Risk, Liability, and
Insurance, University of Haifa.
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1 This Essay's argument is an abridged, restructured, and updated version of an
argument first put forth in Ronen Perry and Tal Z. Zarsky, Liability for Online Anonymous
Speech: Comparative and Economic Analyses, 5 J Eur Tort L 205 (2014).
2 Indirect liability is imposed on one party for another's wrongdoing. See Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 13 & comment a (2000) (discussing the
imputation of liability on one party for another's tortious conduct).
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of substantive defamation law but does entail adaptation of pro-
cedural law, namely, establishing a deanonymization process.
Because this framework provides two potential defendants,
each of whom can be either liable or nonliable, at first glance
there seem to be four possible liability regimes: (1) neither the
speaker nor the content provider is liable, (2) only the speaker is
liable (exclusive direct liability), (3) only the content provider is
liable (exclusive indirect liability), or (4) both may be liable. To
our knowledge, the first option does not exist in any jurisdiction,
and for good reason: forgoing liability undermines the delicate
balance that has developed in defamation law between the right
to reputation and the freedom of speech.3 In this Essay, we reject
the other three alternatives and advocate an outside-the-box so-
lution: the principle of "residual indirect liability."
I. EXCLUSIVE DIRECT LIABILITY
The second possible regime-exclusive direct liability-exists
in the United States. Under American law, it is almost impossible
to bring a lawsuit against a content provider for users' defamatory
statements, even if the content provider knew about the state-
ments' defamatory nature. Traditional defamation law has distin-
guished among three types of intermediaries: "common carriers,"
such as telephone companies, which only transmit information
and are not liable for defamation; 4 "distributors," such as
bookstore owners, which distribute content without having con-
trol over it and are liable only if they knew or had reason to know
about the defamatory nature of the publication;5 and "publishers,"
such as newspapers, which exercise significant control over pub-
lished content and are subject to strict liability.6 In the context of
online anonymous defamation, this framework has generated
skewed incentives.
3 For the purposes of this Essay, we assume that, in each jurisdiction, defamation
law reflects a proper balance between these two interests, taking into account the values
and preferences of the respective society. Thus, we do not aim to challenge the existing
boundaries of liability for defamation but rather aim to investigate which combination of
direct and indirect liability implements that balance in the most cost-effective way in the
context of online anonymous speech.
4 Sewali K. Patel, Immunizing Internet Service Providers from Third-Party Internet
Defamation Claims: How Far Should Courts Go?, 55 Vand L Rev 647, 651 (2002).
5 Id at 651-52.
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In Cubby, Inc v CompuServe Inc7 the court found that Com-
puServe, which provided users with online access to a daily news-
letter but did not review its content, was a mere distributor and
therefore not liable for false and defamatory statements made in
the virtual newsletter.8 Conversely, in Stratton Oakmont, Inc v
Prodigy Services Co,9 the court held that Prodigy, a bulletin board
operator that exercised some editorial control over user-generated
content, was a publisher, and thus could be held liable for defam-
atory statements made by an anonymous user with respect to a
brokerage firm.10 At least some of the statements about the firm
(whose story was depicted in the Martin Scorsese film The Wolf of
Wall Street) were later found to be true.11 But it was too late for
Prodigy. The joint reading of Cubby and Stratton Oakmont cre-
ated an unwarranted incentive for content providers to avoid
moderating online discourse, because moderating content ex-
posed them to the risk of liability.12
Pressures from the Internet industry quickly led to the enact-
ment of § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996,13
whereby online service providers should not be considered pub-
lishers of "any information provided by another information con-
tent provider." 14 In Zeran v America Online, Inc, 15 the court held
that under § 230 a message board operator could not be found
liable for defamatory postings by an anonymous user, even
though the operator had relevant knowledge after a certain point
and would have been considered a publisher under traditional
defamation law.16 Following Zeran, § 230 has provided online
7 776 F Supp 135 (SDNY 1991).
8 Id at 141.
9 1995 WL 323710 (NY Sup).
10 Id at *4-5. For a recent discussion of the impact of Stratton Oakmont, see Anupam
Chander, How LawMade Silicon Valley, 63 Emory L J 639, 650-51 (2014) (discussing how
Congress reacted to the holding of Stratton Oakmont by enacting § 230 of the Communi-
cations Decency Act of 1996).
11 Joe Nocera, Sex and Drugs and I.P.O. s: Martin Scorsese's Approach in 'The Wolf
of Wall Street' (NY Times, Dec 19, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/69RN-KFD3.
12 See Zeran u America Online, Inc, 129 F3d 327, 331 (4th Cir 1997).
13 Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 133, 137, codified as amended at 47 USC § 230.
14 47 USC § 230(c)(1).
15 129 F3d 327 (4th Cir 1997).
16 Id at 330-32.
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content providers (be they publishers or distributors under tradi-
tional law) with effective immunity 1" in a variety of contexts and
from a broad range of causes of action.18
On the other hand, American courts can order content pro-
viders to disclose information about anonymous wrongdoers. The
right to anonymity is well established under American law, and
in some instances-especially when pertaining to speech and as-
sembly-it receives constitutional protection.19 But when there is
sufficient evidence to establish a cause of action against an anon-
ymous wrongdoer, courts enable victims to apply for a John Doe
subpoena, ordering a third party-here the content provider or
the Internet Service Provider (ISP)-to divulge information it
possesses about the anonymous wrongdoer.20 There is still some
controversy about the standard of evidence for establishing the
plaintiffs claim, which must be met prior to issuing such an or-
der,21 but this procedural tool's availability is undisputed.
From an economic perspective, the speaker's liability is a spe-
cial case of direct tort liability, so its economic justifications are
similar-efficient deterrence is the primary goal.22 However, in
the case of online anonymous defamation, direct liability raises
several problems. First and foremost, it entails a special effort in
17 However, empirical studies have shown that more than one-third of such claims
survive the § 230 defense, and accordingly websites often have to engage in long and ex-
pensive legal battles. See Chander, 63 Emory L J at 655 (cited in note 10); David S. Ardia,
Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immun-
ity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 Loyola LA L Rev 373,
493 (2010).
18 For an extensive list of cases, see Chander, 63 Emory L J at 653 n 58 (cited in note
10). The author concludes that § 230 "largely immunized online service providers from
secondary liability for most torts committed through their service." Id at 651.
19 See A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and the Law in the United States, in Ian
Kerr, Valerie Steeves, and Carole Lucock, eds, Lessons from the Identity Trail: Anonymity,
Privacy, and Identity in a Networked Society 441, 442 (Oxford 2009).
20 Nathaniel Gleicher, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard,
118 Yale L J 320, 325 (2008) (examining the efficacy of John Doe subpoenas and suggesting
a change to the system).
21 See Solove and Schwartz, Information Privacy Law at 600 (cited in note 6). See
also Gleicher, 118 Yale L J at 325, 337, 340-50 (cited in note 20) (identifying seven cases
addressing distinct standards and adding the "good faith standard'-a slightly altered
"summary judgment" rule in a case that involved trespass to chattels-as well as an al-
tered "prima facie" rule). Courts have begun using a stricter standard for "unmasking"
anonymous third parties. Id at 343. See also, for example, Doe v 2TheMart.com Inc, 140 F
Supp 2d 1088, 1096-97 (WD Wash 2001) (quashing a subpoena request for identification
of anonymous online users because the request failed to show that the information related
to the core claim).
22 See generally Alain Sheer and Asghar Zardkoohi, An Analysis of the Economic
Efficiency of the Law of Defamation, 80 Nw U L Rev 364 (1985) (analyzing the goals and
consequences of defamation law from an economic perspective).
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identifying the wrongdoer. The victim needs to obtain the anony-
mous speaker's Internet Protocol (IP) address from the content
provider and then obtain the anonymous speaker's identity from
the ISP, as identified by the IP address. Because these two steps
jeopardize both the anonymous speaker's freedom of speech and
his or her right to privacy, the legal process is cautious and com-
plex and therefore very costly to navigate. Moreover, sophisti-
cated users can hide their IP addresses by, for example, using
anonymizing proxy servers or anonymizing software such as
Tor.23 Even when the real IP address used for wrongdoing can be
ascertained, it may be very difficult to attribute the defamatory
statement to a specific person if the wrongdoer was connected to
a publicly accessible router (for example, at a coffee shop, hotel,
or library)24 or-perhaps illegally-to another person's private
router.25 An action against the speaker may also be impossible if
neither the content provider nor the speaker's ISP retains a log of
users' activities for a long-enough period (as occurred in Zeran).26
Finally, a legal disclosure mechanism would often be restricted
by territorial boundaries, enabling anonymous speakers who
23 See Doug Lichtman and Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Account-
able, 14 S Ct Econ Rev 221, 234 (2006) (explaining that sophisticated wrongdoers can "con-
ceal their tracks by routing messages through a convoluted path that is difficult for au-
thorities to uncover"); Raymond Placid and Judy Wynekoop, Tracking Down Anonymous
Internet Abusers: Who Is John Doe?, 85 Fla Bar J 38, 39 (2011) (discussing the use of proxy
servers, enabled by services such as Tor, that can mask anonymous posters' IP addresses).
In the related context of online anonymous copyright infringement, a federal district court
explicitly admitted that "the technology that enables [wrongdoing] has outpaced technol-
ogy that prevents it." Hard Drive Productions, Inc v Does 1-90, 2012 WL 1094653, *7 (ND
Cal) (denying a discovery request to identify anonymous online users in a copyright in-
fringement case).
24 In fact, this was one of the reasons for denying a John Doe subpoena in the copy-
right infringement case of VPR Internationale u Does 1-1017, 2011 WL 8179128, *2 (CD
Ill) ("The list of IP addresses attached to VPR's complaint suggests, in at least some in-
stances, a similar disconnect between IP subscriber and copyright infringer. The ISPs in-
clude a number of universities, such as Carnegie Mellon, Columbia, and the University of
Minnesota, as well as corporations and utility companies.").
25 See, for example, Carolyn Thompson, Bizarre Pornography Raid Underscores Wi-
Fi Privacy Risks (NBC News, Apr 24, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/L5VC-HYHB (de-
scribing cases in which homeowners were initially accused by federal agents for download-
ing child pornography but it later came to light that other parties had connected to the
homeowners' wireless routers to commit these offenses).
26 Zeran, 129 F3d at 329 n 1. The cost of information retention is correlated with the
amount of daily traffic and the required duration of retention. More importantly, retention
laws should not infringe basic rights. On April 8, 2014, the European Court of Justice held
that the EU Data Retention Directive, Directive 2006/24/EC, which required telecom com-
panies to store user data for up to two years, was invalid because it infringed on the right
to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data. Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v
Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, Case C-293/12, 2014 ECJ
CELEX LEXIS 238, *19-20 (Court of Justice 2014).
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make defamatory statements on foreign websites or through for-
eign ISPs to get off scot-free. For example, the Supreme Court of
Virginia recently examined the "territorial limits of [its] subpoena
power."27 It vacated a John Doe subpoena issued at the request of
a Virginia carpet-cleaning business to a California-based
business-rating website (Yelp), which published anonymous us-
ers' negative reviews of the plaintiff, because the statements were
published outside its jurisdiction.28 If the defamatory statements
were published in a different country, rather than a different
state, the plaintiff would face even greater obstacles.
In summary, identifying an online anonymous speaker might
be very difficult. If the speaker is not identified, he or she evades
liability, the costs of anonymous defamation are not fully inter-
nalized, and the potential wrongdoers are not efficiently deterred.
If, on the other hand, the speaker is identified through a costly
process, wrongdoers may internalize the costs of their wrongdo-
ing, but the administrative costs may outweigh the benefits in
terms of cost-reducing deterrence. Alternatively, the high admin-
istrative costs associated with identifying the primary wrongdoer
might render another party (for example, the content provider) a
more cost-effective target for enforcement efforts. Exclusive direct
liability can raise additional problems, which we shall not elabo-
rate on here due to space constraints, such as the relatively high
likelihood that there will be judgment-proof defendants.
II. EXCLUSIVE INDIRECT LIABILITY
The third possible regime-exclusive indirect liability-
seems to apply in Israel. On the one hand, Israeli law recognizes
content providers' liability under certain circumstances. First,
§ 11 of the local Defamation Act 29 provides that if a communica-
tion medium publishes defamatory content, its operator can be
held liable.30 However, because the term "communication me-
dium" covers only newspapers, radio, and television,31 the poten-
tial use of § 11 in cases of online anonymous defamation is very
27 Yelp, Inc v Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc, 770 SE2d 440, 444 (Va 2015).
28 Id at 445-46.
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limited. Second, negligent supervision of user-generated content
may result in liability for negligence.32
On the other hand, there is no procedural tool for obliging
intermediaries to disclose information about anonymous users, so
such users have de facto immunity. In Mor v Barak ITC,33 the Is-
raeli Supreme Court held that there is no procedural framework
for granting an order that obliges a content provider to reveal an
anonymous user's identity, and that such a framework should not
be devised through the judicial system. 34 As a matter of fact, the
Court's holding reflects a conscious preference for freedom of
speech in general and anonymous speech in particular, rather
than a genuine lack of procedural tools. This judicial policy was
also affirmed in the related context of online anonymous copy-
right infringement.35 While several attempts have been made to
introduce a deanonymization procedure through primary legisla-
tion,36 none has succeeded.
An exclusive indirect liability regime overcomes some of the
problems associated with direct liability-including underdeter-
rence of anonymous speakers-but raises new difficulties. First,
the cost of precautions available to content providers may be pro-
hibitively high. Human monitoring of user-generated content en-
tails hiring and training staff to read such content and distin-
guish between legitimate and nonlegitimate content. The cost per
statement is substantial, and it is incurred with respect to all
user-generated content-as opposed to the cost of identifying an
anonymous speaker under a direct liability regime, which is in-
curred only in the rare case of a legal complaint about a defama-
tory statement. Automated monitoring requires the development
and implementation of technologies that preclude defamatory
statements while allowing legitimate speech. Once the mecha-
nism has been developed, it can be implemented at a very low
marginal cost-but automated systems are still expected to make
more judgment mistakes than trained humans, and human cor-
rection mechanisms are costly. Alternatively, content providers
32 Permission Civ App 1700/10 Dubitsky v Shapira, *6-7 (unpublished, Isr S Ct
2010).
33 Permission Civ App 4447/07 Mor v Barak ITC Intl Telecommunications Corp,
63(3) PD 664 (Isr S Ct 2010).
34 Id at 717.
35 Civ App 9183/09 The Football Association Premier League v John Doe, *33 (un-
published, Isr S Ct 2012).
36 See, for example, Disclosure of User Information in Electronic Communications
Network Bill, 2011 HH 36 (Isr); Disclosure of User Information in Electronic Communica-
tions Network Bill, 2012 HH 1376 (Isr).
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may be required to employ a "notice-and-takedown" procedure, in
which the content provider removes user-generated content when
notified that this content is suspected of being defamatory.37 The
main advantage of this method is that it significantly reduces
monitoring costs. But an automatic notice-and-takedown system
enables anyone with the desire to silence another's speech to do
so easily and to engage in mass censorship,38 whereas integrating
human discretion in the system increases the costs.
Moreover, most user-generated content is legitimate and so-
cially beneficial. Web 2.0 users "create positive externalities en-
joyed by advertisers, information providers, merchants, friends,
and acquaintances." 39 Yet indirect liability makes content provid-
ers internalize the expected harms caused by (rare) defamatory
statements, without capturing the full social benefits of their ac-
tivities.40 This may result in overdeterrence in the form of exces-
sive monitoring and overzealous censorship by content
providers.41
Finally, even if content providers choose the proper level of
care, uncertainties may arise with respect to the defamatory na-
ture of each statement. These uncertainties force content provid-
ers to choose between two types of potential errors: (1) false neg-
atives, namely, identifying a defamatory statement as
nondefamatory; and (2) false positives, namely, identifying a non-
defamatory statement as defamatory. Because a content pro-
vider's liability derives from the publication of a defamatory
statement by a user, a false negative carries the risks of litigation
37 A notice-and-takedown regime applies to online copyright infringements in the
United States. See 17 USC § 512. See also Douglas Lichtman and William Landes, Indirect
Liability for Copyright Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 Harv J L & Tech 395,
396-99 (2003) (discussing the common-law doctrines of contributory infringement and vi-
carious liability as methods utilized by courts to hold third parties liable for copyright
infringement).
38 Cecilia Ziniti, Note, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Providers:
How Zeran v America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 Berkeley Tech L J
583, 606 (2008). By analogy, "empirical evidence indicates that more than a quarter of
[Digital Millennium Copyright Act] takedown notices are either on shaky legal grounds or
address cases in which no copyrights are violated." Id at 605.
39 Lichtman and Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable at 225 (cited
in note 23) (referring to ISP subscribers in general).
40 Assaf Hamdani, Who's Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 Cornell L Rev 901, 917-18,
921 (2002).
41 Id at 917-18. See also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy
to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 Harv J L & Tech 1, 13 n 30 (2003) ("ISPs do
not fully share the benefits its subscribers derive from placing material, whether infring-
ing or non-infringing, on the network. As a result, imposing liability on ISPs for subscrib-
ers' infringing material induces ISPs to overdeter, purging any material that a copyright
holder claims is infringing.").
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and liability whereas a false positive does not. In our case, acting
on a false positive does not seem to have a real cost at all (removal
is almost costless). This imbalance induces content providers to
remove suspicious yet nondefamatory speech: to avoid liability,
companies would rather err on the side of silencing speech.42 In
addition, they may be induced to block provocative users, disable
user contributions, or reduce demand for Web 2.0 technologies,
thus impeding progress and innovation.
III. CONCURRENT LIABILITY
The fourth possible regime-concurrent liability-exists in
the European Union. In the absence of relevant EU Regulations,
a comprehensive analysis of the law applicable to the issues at
hand calls for a separate examination of the national law in each
member state, and state laws differ in many respects. 43 In this
Essay we merely strive to delineate the contours of the European
framework. These are drawn by the E-Commerce Directive 44 and
by two decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the
case of Delfi AS v Estonia.45 These sources define a general model,
which can be compared to the alternatives even without delving
into the intricacies of its implementation in each member state.
On the one hand, a victim of online anonymous defamation
can frequently bring an action against the content provider. True,
Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive provides that some inter-
mediaries (such as hosting service providers) are liable only if
they knew about the wrongful statement and failed to remove it
following the victim's request (a notice-and-takedown regime).46
But many content providers are not considered intermediaries for
these purposes. In Delfi, the European Court of Human Rights
held that a news website was liable for defamation in anonymous
42 See Zeran, 129 F3d at 333:
Because service providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of
information, and not for its removal, they would have a natural incentive simply
to remove messages upon notification, whether the contents were defamatory or
not.... Thus, [indirect liability] has a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet
speech.
43 Thibault Verbiest, et al, Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries *14 (Nov
12, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/Y9WQ-6TXN ("National implementation and court
practice differ between member states considerably when assessing actual knowledge.").
44 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic
Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce), 2000 OJ L178 1
(July 17, 2000).
45 App No 64569/09 (Eur Ct Hum Rts 2013).
46 Directive 2000/31/EC, 2000 OJ L178 at 13 (cited in note 44).
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user comments. 47 The Court agreed that the website was a pub-
lisher rather than an intermediary, and that it therefore was not
exempt from the duty to monitor or from liability, despite imple-
menting a notice-and-takedown system. 48 In mid-June 2015, the
Grand Chamber of the Court upheld the earlier decision, possibly
limiting its application to news portals. 49
On the other hand, the European framework enables the
court to order content providers to disclose information about
anonymous speakers. Article 15(2) of the E-Commerce Directive
allows member states to establish obligations for service provid-
ers to transfer users' identifying information to competent au-
thorities, including courts.5 0 Of course, disclosure processes
should comply with the Data Protection Directive,51 the E-Privacy
Directive,52 and national data protection laws, rendering such
processes complex and state specific.53 Regardless, there are ex-
amples of disclosure orders in cases of online anonymous defama-
tion. For instance, at the request of Irish-based airline Ryanair,
the Irish High Court issued an order requiring Eircom, the Irish
national telecommunications provider, to disclose the identities of
anonymous users who posted defamatory comments about the
airline.54
Concurrent liability has two advantages. First, by imposing
liability on content providers in addition to online speakers, it
overcomes the main flaw of exclusive direct liability: underdeter-
rence resulting from the high cost of identifying and pursuing
anonymous speakers (and to a lesser extent from the problem of
47 Delfi, App No 64569/09 at *33-34. See also generally Mart Susi, International De-
cision: Delfi AS v. Estonia, 108 Am J Intl L 295 (2014) (discussing the Delfi decision).
48 Delfi, App No 64569/09 at *31-32.
49 Delfi AS v Estonia, App No 64569/09, *34 (Grand Chamber 2015).
50 Directive 2000/31/EC, 2000 GJ L178 at 13 (cited in note 44).
51 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 )J L281 31 (Nov 11, 1995).
52 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July
2002 concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Elec-
tronic Communications Sector (Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communication), 2002
OJ L201 37 (July 31, 2002).
53 See Verbiest, et al, Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries at *77-82
(cited in note 43).
54 Ryanair Seeks to ID Defamatory' Online Parties (Irish Examiner, Feb 13, 2013),
archived at http://perma.cc/GV7F-D7PP. For further discussion of Irish case law, see
Verbiest, et al, Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries at *78-79 (cited in note
43). Irish law makes use of Norwich Pharmacal orders to uncloak anonymous speakers, a
measure originating in the United Kingdom (and discussed in Part IV).
20151
10
University of Chicago Law Review Online, Vol. 82 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 12
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev_online/vol82/iss1/12
The University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue
judgment-proof defendants). If the speaker is not sufficiently de-
terred because he or she can be identified only at a very high cost
or not at all, or if he or she cannot fully compensate the victim,
indirect liability incentivizes content providers to take the neces-
sary precautions. Second, parties who are jointly liable for a par-
ticular harm have an interest in reducing their own shares of the
burden. Because any difficulty in identifying and pursuing speak-
ers will result in greater expected liability for the content pro-
vider, the latter has an incentive to facilitate the identification of
anonymous speakers. To do so, content providers may collect user
information and volunteer this information in the case of a
lawsuit.55
However, concurrent liability also has several disadvantages.
First, to the extent that both parties are at risk of being liable and
that each has a somewhat different perception of what may con-
stitute defamation, imposing liability on both may restrict free-
dom of speech more than singling out one defendant ("double cen-
sorship").56 Second, a combination of direct and indirect liability
may result in an aggregation of the implementation costs of both.
Content providers will be led to monitor user-generated content
at a high cost that could be saved under an effective direct liabil-
ity regime. At the same time, lawsuits will be brought against
anonymous speakers at high administrative costs that could be
saved under an effective indirect liability regime.
IV. RESIDUAL INDIRECT LIABILITY
So far we have established the following: exclusive direct lia-
bility entails prohibitively high identification costs, exclusive in-
direct liability involves high monitoring costs, and concurrent li-
ability aggregates these two types of costs. In our opinion, the
efficient solution for online anonymous defamation lies beyond
the four classical categories explained in the Introduction and in-
volves an innovative combination of direct and indirect liability.
In a legal regime that we call "residual indirect liability," the
speaker is exclusively liable, but if he or she is not reasonably
reachable, the content provider becomes liable. We found an
55 Content providers might not be very keen to drag their users into court, because
this may harm their business. But the ability to share the burden will surely result in
some increase in the likelihood of data collection.
56 The set of statements considered defamatory by either party is the union of the set
of statements considered defamatory by the speaker and the set of statements considered
so by the content provider, which is equivalent to or larger than each set individually.
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interesting development in this direction in England, in the re-
cently enacted Defamation Act 201357 ("Defamation Act"). For
over forty years, English law has recognized the Norwich Phar-
macal Order, by which a third party who becomes involved in the
tortious acts of another is obliged to submit information that can
assist the victim in establishing his or her claim against the
wrongdoer, regardless of whether the third party was voluntarily
involved.58 Such orders have frequently been issued in the context
of online anonymous defamation.59
The Defamation Act links the speaker's availability to the
content provider's liability. Section 5(2) stipulates that a website
operator is generally not liable for a defamatory statement posted
on the website if it was not the one who posted that statement.6 0
However, the defense can be defeated (and the content provider
exposed to liability) if the victim had insufficient information to
identify and bring proceedings against the speaker, the victim
gave notice of the complaint, and the content provider did not
properly respond to the complaint.61 A proper response requires
either obtaining the speaker's contact information and providing
it to the victim, or removing the defamatory content.6 2
Under this innovative regime, costly monitoring may become
redundant, and overdeterrence caused by noninternalization of
the vast economic benefits of Web 2.0 technologies and by the
asymmetric response to errors in judgment is avoided. Theoreti-
cally, if content providers under a residual liability regime allow
postings by unreachable speakers, they might still need to moni-
tor to avoid liability. Even so, monitoring will be limited to con-
tent generated by unidentifiable speakers, so the cost will be
much lower than in the case of exclusive indirect liability or con-
current liability. In practice, content providers would probably
prefer to avoid liability through cheaper means such as (1) obtain-
ing user identification data, at least when an automatic content
analysis algorithm identifies suspected defamation, or (2) remov-
ing content generated by unreachable speakers on notification of
its defamatory potential. At the same time, this regime incentiv-
izes content providers to take measures that reduce the cost of
57 Ch 26 (UK). The Act was enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom but
generally extends only to England and Wales. Defamation Act, ch 26 § 17(2).
58 See Norwich Pharmacal Co u Customs and Excise Commissioners, 1974 App Cas
133, 133-34, 175 (HL 1974).
59 See, for example, Totalise PLC u The Motley Fool Ltd, [2001] EWHC 706 (QB).
60 Defamation Act, ch 26 § 5(2).
61 Defamation Act, ch 26 § 5(3)-(4).
62 See Defamation Act, ch 26 § 5(3)(c), (5).
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identifying anonymous wrongdoers (measures like collecting user
identification data), and thereby deters wrongdoing. Finally, it
does not raise the characteristic problems of concurrent liability,
particularly cost aggregation.
Admittedly, this method is not perfect, but its main flaws are
either minor or solvable. For example, on the constitutional level,
collecting and providing user information may jeopardize the
right to speak with anonymity (especially in the United States)63
and the right to privacy (especially in the European Union).64
However, these problems seem solvable: databases can and
should be protected, and information may be disclosed only when
a court determines that several preconditions-including, for ex-
ample, a high likelihood that an action for defamation will suc-
ceed-are met. The English Defamation Act provides a somewhat
different solution by allowing the speaker to decide whether he or
she wishes to directly confront the victim or prefers that the state-
ment simply be removed. On the economic level, a content pro-
vider may get off scot-free by providing information about the
speaker, even when the latter is judgment-proof. In such cases,
no one bears the full burden, so the incentives are impaired. How-
ever, this problem seems minor: while content providers usually
have deeper pockets than users, the scope of the harm caused in
the typical online defamation case may not be beyond the
speaker's compensation capacity. The harm may be particularly
small in the case of anonymous defamation, given the relatively
weak reliability and credibility of anonymous speakers. If there
are nonetheless settings in which speakers cannot normally com-
pensate for the harm caused, an extension of content providers'
liability under the residual indirect liability regime may be
appropriate.
In summary, residual indirect liability simultaneously solves
the main problems of exclusive direct liability and exclusive indi-
rect liability without raising the problems of concurrent liability.
While it may raise some other difficulties, these complications are
mostly insignificant or easily solvable. Thus, this model should be
63 See McIntyre u Ohio Elections Commission, 514 US 334, 357 (1995) (finding that
an author's decision to remain anonymous is protected by the First Amendment); Doe U
2TheMart.com, Inc, 140 F Supp 2d 1088, 1092 (WD Wash 2001) ("A component of the First
Amendment is the right to speak with anonymity. ... The right to speak anonymously
extends to speech via the Internet.").
64 See, for example, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd u Minister for Communications, Ma-
rine and Natural Resources, Case C-293/12, 2014 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 238, *19-20 (Court
of Justice 2014) (finding that the EU Data Retention Directive infringed the right to pri-
vacy and the right to the protection of personal data).
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seriously considered by legislatures interested in efficiently regu-
lating online anonymous defamation.65
CONCLUSION
This Essay examines various solutions to the problem of
online anonymous defamation. The American model bars content
providers' indirect liability but facilitates identification of the
speaker. From an economic perspective, the main problem with
this model is that direct liability for online anonymous defama-
tion entails special efforts in identifying and pursuing the
speaker. If the speaker is not identified, the costs of defamation
are not fully internalized and potential wrongdoers are not effi-
ciently deterred. If the speaker is identified through a costly pro-
cess, the administrative costs may outweigh the benefits in terms
of cost-reducing deterrence.
The Israeli model recognizes content providers' liability in
some circumstances but does not provide procedural tools for
identifying the speaker. The basic problem with exclusive indirect
liability is the relatively high cost of precautions. Monitoring is
very costly, and while a notice-and-takedown scheme may reduce
costs, an automatic system may result in excessive limitation of
the freedom of speech-and human discretion once again entails
very high costs, especially for websites with heavy traffic. Another
problem is that content providers do not capture the full social
benefits of their activities, so bearing the costs may result in over-
deterrence. A third problem is the asymmetric legal response to
errors with respect to the defamatory nature of statements (a
false negative carries the risks of litigation and liability whereas
a false positive does not).
The EU framework enables the victim to request identifica-
tion of the speaker and simultaneously bring an action against
the content provider. Although there is variance among member
states, this model seems to comply with the relevant Directives
and European Court decisions. Concurrent liability ensures that
proper measures are taken to avoid defamation even if the anon-
ymous speaker cannot be identified and pursued at a reasonable
65 For alternative solutions to the problem of online defamation, see Paul Ehrlich,
Note, Communications Decency Act § 230, 17 Berkeley Tech L J 401, 401-02, 411-19
(2002) (arguing for either a return to distributor liability or a combination of blanket im-
munity and elimination of anonymity); Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Har-
bors, 6 J Telecomm & High Tech L 101, 102, 117 (2007) (discussing a safe harbor system
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cost. Moreover, it incentivizes each content provider to facilitate
the identification of anonymous speakers in order to reduce its
own expected burden, thereby increasing the likelihood of inter-
nalization by the primary wrongdoer. But concurrent liability
may restrict freedom of speech more than singling out one defend-
ant, and it may lead to the aggregation of the implementation
costs of direct and indirect liability.
The recently adopted English model enables the victim to
pursue a claim against the speaker, and it imposes liability on the
content provider if the speaker is unavailable. Residual indirect
liability has several advantages: it significantly reduces the need
for monitoring and prevents the overdeterrence associated with
unaccounted benefits and asymmetric responses to errors; it in-
centivizes content providers to reduce the costs of identifying
anonymous wrongdoers; and it does not raise the characteristic
problems of multiple defendants, such as the excessive restriction
of the freedom of speech or the aggregation of costs. This model
may also raise difficulties on the legal and economic levels, but
they seem to us either insignificant or solvable.
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